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IN

THE

SUP:till{L

1

(~u~~~~~

.
.
.

-o-o-o-o-o-0-o-oeo-o-oSTATE OF UTAH

Respondent
vs.
E,--rJGENE MYERS

Appellant

.
.

-o-o-o-o-o-0-o-o-o-o-oComes nov.r the Appellant in this Cause
having failed to obtain the effective lisslstance of legal Counsel, to attempt to file a

REPLY BRIEF to the Brief of the Hespondent.
Appellant submits that he has had no
formal trianing in law and is somewhat ignore
of legal procedures; however, handicapped,

1.-1 i · ·

what the Respondent at page 17 of his Brief
11

e:1L

Misconception of the Law" the Aqpellant

attempts to submit an acceptable

tU~PLY.

In the absence of Counsels who in fear

of the "heatn of what Honorable, Lewis Jones
has called a "HOT POr.I'ATO" (R. -46) and those

laW"".f e r s
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/

.....

having strfctly adhered

to an apparent tribu-

nal ultimatum of " hands off the Myers' case",
the Appellant now stands alone - seeking some

form of the

11

Justice for all" that he was told
l

he was fighting for during thirty (30) months

of • Honorable• service in the U.

1946 -

s.

Navy (19L!-3·

274-96-14).
Appellant submits this Reply Brief for

the purpose of pointing out misleading connotations, predjudicial suppositions and generalizations and appeals beyond the issue; all of
which are contained in the Respondent's Brief
and should suffice only to insult the integrity

of this Honorable Court and strengthen the
Appellant's contentions of having been grossly
wronged throughout the expiration of almost
twen~y-elght

(28) months of continuous imprison-

ment.
The Respondent apparently labors under an

un-American motto of • Upholding a Conviction
obta~ned by

an:r means". Which position,if taken,

is frowned upon and proved fatal in all Courts

of Justice.

In one of Mr. Joseph McCarthy's "Loyalty

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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·3Cases'ff -.- Casc-No-.--5iF --

U. S. v. VAL R. LORT.JI~:r.

A.justice Department Prosecutor, Mr. William
A. Gallagher was no doubt working under the
"CONVICTION BY ANY MEANS" theory and :forgot his ..

" Oath of Office" and sought a conviction of
Lorwin by unjust means, in that he obtained an
indictment on false promises to the Grand Jury.

When

u. s.

Attorney- General, Herbert Brownell

3r. learned of such travesty of Justice, he
caused the dismissal of the said Prosecutor,
William A. Gallaher and issued the following
statement to all other men of America who are
part ot a prosecuting body -

"WE HAVE A DUTY

OVER AND ABOVE PROSBOOTIONS AND CONVICTIONS THAT IS, TO SEB '!HAT JUSTICE IS DONE" •

Appellant submits that no attempt at seeing that justice is done in this case is entertained by the Respontent as evidenced by his
decision to pur.ue further this case that is

almost two and one-half (2t) years old and whicl
case has been termed b7 legal authorities as
" IRREGULAR"

1

"

UNUSUAL"

1

"

BUTCHERED" •

" Appellant left holding the bag" and " HOT
POTATO" •
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··~
~&i!fi~

ft em· any

't'ossj.bl~

contention of

"duty• 1 t ia p1a1n .from the rec~rd 1-n this

matter and in view ot additional weight of
authorit7 herein eited, tb&;t a. 41sregard for

conatitut1on&l

j~lat1cae

and. • pa.1t10B that a

conv1at1on 'b7 1lJl$U8t. q4 1:J4,egal means should
be auppo:rte.4

faotora

~

ev14ent1J' t·b• dominating

~event::lDI

·tJhe Appelf-nt. from reoe~v-

1ns leD£ OYe%'-clu.e ....44rea• or ~ievanoes "•

Aw•·llaat- bu.· obaerred. YeFJ poaaible

deliberatp twi•tlal• att.4·alterationil.

and

incon-

ceivable· ·•laatlap 1a . tdlle Be•ponq11tt_s "Statement ot

J'u,,,• lnat ~••• •·• be lured into

a

lons l'e'buttal of t ..t...,l'lJ". that .ahould never
have been beazt4 •ct ._.14 bai~••n iaJ?eached,

it had, it

tu

A~Uut woul4 have been accord-

ed hi a " OO. .'l'I'l'UTIOX.U.. GUARAN'I'ZICS" •. • spec if ically .. A • Pall' -1~ 11 • in the •·•nse of' havinf

Pl'epare4 &114 wlllS.C eD\IUelJ beins confronted
by one

or

two •-.~a'--t• ap1nat tliaJ having

a coapulael'j" J*Oa••• 1J.o eoap.el the a,ttendance

ot witne••••. <. .IIJU'l'IJII~ WI'.l'IBSIBS• ) 1n his
behalf and "l'ot ..tnr1o• be tns put in jeopardy

for the aaae etfena•••
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rt- 1-s hite:MJ:!tting to note that at page

3 of Respondent's Brief, he states

that the

Appellant was returned to the County Jail on
October 26,
Court

1955

and was not called over to

and informed of his trial date until

November 16, 19$$ ••• TWENTY DAYS LATER ••••
can one justly say that the Court did not knou
that the Appellant was back at the jail - consistent with its orders ? That the Court was
not aware of the Appellant's impecuniosity and
his not being represented by Counsel, when a
look at the record would have clearly shown
such?

How are the twenty ( 20) days of SILENCI·~

from the Court justified when contrasted with
the " INSUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF TIME THEREAFrER
GIVEN COUNSEL TO PREPARE A DEFENSE FOR THE

APPELLANT" ? ?

At the bottom of page 3 of the Respondent's Brief, he admits that the Court ordered
that Counsel for the defendant (App.) motion
for a Continuance be denie~7 • Which motion only
sought what the " Sp.preme Law of The LaRd"
guarantees the accused i.e.,"a fair trial" in
which the accused among other requisites would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l

haV<: tl1_0 "a~~i_s t,;..:,nc e w

of Pih:.? AHED and HILL-

ING COUNSEL IN HIS BEHALF o

That Counsel for

the Appellant did not have ample time to get
these constitutional guarantees for the Appellant is clearly set forth in his own words which
constitute his Motion for a Continuance whicb.
is as follows: - (Verbatim) •••
" Comes now the defendant, Eugene Nyers
and moves the above entitled Court for an ordE::l.,
continuing his trial date from the 25th. day
of November, 1955 to the 5th. of January, 1956
or some date there-after within the discretion
of the Court. This motion is based upon the
grounds that Counsel for the defendant was
appointed on the 17th. day of November, 1955
and seven (7) days is not sufficient to prepare
a defense in the defendant's behalf. Further,
that the defendant has a material witness at
80 Stone St, Newark, New Jersey and another

2

t

525 Fifth Avenue, Seattle, Washington, which
he feels would be aids in his defense, and the
time allotted counsel to contact these -vritnesses before trial is not sufficient.
Dated this 19tij. day of November, 1955
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fp,f

1D.DB Jl. ASHWORTH

(R. 'P. R~)

-'1----

At Page 10 of Respondent's Brief, he

attampts to paint the picture that this case
began on July 1,

19.54

with a Mr. Callicott

signing a Complaint charging the Appallant
with Grand Larceny - Case No. 14608; whereas
on the contrary this oase began on March 29th.

19.54

14571

as Case

under the name of Robbery.

And on the date mentioned by the Respondent -

July

1, 1954. -

~

the Diatrict Attorney, Mr• Aldan

J. Anderson (in· .1\ldge Van Cott' s Court ) ·on

1954.

July 3.

-

-

-·(sat.) deaoribed that day accurat·

.

-

-

ely in h1s answer to hi a honor's question of
-

why the Appellant vas before the Court ••• MR.
ANDERSON I

•

lhe .

C~l

yas on 1 SHA.l\EY GROUNDS 1 ,

your Honor and we let this man plead gUilty" •

THE COURT: " There is nothing in the record to

show that , _70U better get the record straight".

The •sH.A.KBY GROUNDS " on which the Dist.
Att., admitted the
became

1;#!1 (No

•sHA:KBY" at the

Appellant) stood

following time':

L. Atter'the jurr had been impaneled
sworn to

trr

and

the Appellant and his codefendant·,

OLIVER 'l'OWNBBil>,
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z...

-vA!t.er .the A..zsist. Dist. Att., a r::rr.

D. Christiamn Ronnow had been"reprimanded" by
the Court for making a"predjudicial statement

11

before the jury in his opening address.

3•

When one of the complainants, DEAN

JONES, was about to take the witness stand and
a Mr. John J. Berger, (a 6aucasian) raised his
hands for the attention of the Court and told
Judge, Lewis that he would like to speak with
him in his chambers.. • (

while in the judge 1 s

chambers) Mr. Berger stated

th~

he knew the

State's first witness who was about to taki

the stand - DEAN JONES, and proceeded to tell
the

judge what a"drunkard " and " No good thir:t_,''

he knew Jones to be and that Jones had "Secret1J

married a nice girl named"Joann Harrington" and
if he stayed on the jury he would find"FOR

THE DEFENDANTS"•
Appellant has since learned that true to
the

~st.

Attorney 1 s statement, the STATE was

indeed on "SHAKEY GROUNDS" •

When the Appellant refused the STATE'S
DEAL to get 1 tself off "SHAKEY GROUND", Appell-

ant's
lawyer,
BenFunding
D.for digitization
Browning
looked
atand Library
theServices
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
provided by the
Institute of Museum
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

clocl.{ ancl

said " \-le

YH:tve tHo minutes," either

'Cop out to Grand Larceny or I•ll withdraw •••
(R. 7-9).

Appellant submits that he was afraid

and confused and under the coercion and threats
of Counsel he unwillingly pled guilty to the
SECOND INFORIYIATION alleging the identical cri:e:1s
for which he had allready been placed in jeopar•
dy along with a co-defendant, Oliver Townsend
and was still in jeopardy at the very moment
that he was FORCED

to~enter

the said plea of

guilty.
Again at page 10 of his Brief 1 the Respon.dent makes an ambiguous reference to the Appellant's former attorney, stating that he was a
"GOOD" attorney ••• ? ••• Good in what respect?
Good for the state? ••• Good at explaining away
the Court's errors? ••• Good at deserting and
forcing a client to plead guilty while the
STATE

- not the defendant is on "SHAHEY

GR.OU~TI,,

the latter is supported by documentary evidence
(R. 7-9) ••• What does a lawyer 1 s 11 goodness" or
even genius mean to a defendant who cannnot bene·
fit by such assets because he is the victim of
aSponsored
"HOT
POTATO".
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Also at. .pa.ge 10 of his brief, the resyon-

dent would have the Court believe that from
May

17, 1954-(date of preliminary hearing on

the instant case which at that time was called
"Robbery") to July 1, 19.5L~ - the date of the
trial on said robbery, Appellant's lawyer did
not have time to"investigate" Appellant's case
but went into Court to defend the Appellant in
a Robbery trial with the idea of "investigatingtt
as the trial pro-ceeded

11 • ••••

States Respond.

" After his attorney made an investigation of
the case he felt that Appellant would be best
served by entering a plea of guilty to Grand
LtfFceny"••• Appellant submits that the record
shows the contrary of _what the Respondent calls
an "Investigation" the Record at Pages 7-9 sho1n:
adesertion by Counsel for the Appellant and the
use of Coercion and threats etc. -

A "deal" in

which someone (Not appellant) waived Alpellani;' ['
Preliminary hearing om the instant case and the
record shows (Ibid) that an obvious pact existel:
between Appellant's lawyer and the prosecution
which pact the Appellant 1 s lawyer refused to brerl1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
when
the Library
Appellant
refused to "Cop out" (Plead
Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11guil~'·y)

t-o Grand Larceny.

Surely an" Investigation" by Appilant•s
lawyer would have revealed (As the Dist. Att.
80

accurately stated) - that the"STATE WAS OH

SHAKEY GROUN.Dstt. And if the Appellant's lawyer
is as"good"as that Respondent would have the
Court believe he is, then an investigation
would not have been necessary to detect the
State's "SHAKEY GROUNDS", especially in view
of the

juror's revelation and the Dist. Att.

(Assist. District Attorney's "REPRIPIAND" recei ved from the Court in the presence of the jury.
Also at page 10,

ef

his brief, the Respon-

dent labels the Appellant's attempt to realize
receipt of the • Equal pr~tection of the laws",
along with other "Constitut·ional Guarantees" he
fought"to preserv~" during World War II., as
unlimited Substitution• and goes on to state that

"StE" attorneys were-appointed by the Court to
represent the Appellant.

Who were they? ••• .lms.

1. Mr. Allan Swan: - who was appointed tp
prepare an affidavit in which the Appellant tole
the Court about the- illegal tactics employed by
the State and the Appellant's attorney. After

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-12compi~!n~ teh!! ~a-slt, ~J!r. Swan withdrew and he

will state that he did not have a single differ·
ence with the Appellant.
2. A. Mr. Houston: - who has a deep
Southern acdent walked into the visiting booth
at the jail and said to the Appellant - a balding negro who was twenty-eight years ofage(at
that time) •••
MR. HOUSTON: "Hello

1

BOY 1 , what's wrong? •••

Appellant at this point was somewhat speechless
- a man was before him

- he didn't know his

name nor his occupation; ••• something about
th~

stranger's eye-sight gave him the delusion

that the Appellant was a "BOY" and by some deduction he was able to arrive at the conclusion
that something was wrong. Above all, he brouc;ht
his daughter (or a little girl about ten (10)
years of age ) along with him to discuss the
Appellant's case.

Appellant was hesitant to

discuss his case in the presence of the young
lady and when _I.r. Houston asked... " Vfhat color
were these people -'white or colored'?" Appellant felt that this man who ever he was I
apparently wanted to make a "Race Issue" out of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the hs&

'Whie'l{ o.P eonrsa the Appellant defini-

tely didn't want or he would have sought the
services of the NAACP. Appellant submits that
he could not cooperate with a man of such dmsposition.
A Mr. DOD CASS~:

Mr. Cassity• s connection

with the prosecuting agencY should have, consistent with ethics, prevented him from being

:

appointed as counsel for a defendant in a FELONY

complaint.

However, he did let the Appellant

know that he did not wiah to defend him when he
walked over to the jail phone and called someone
(supposedly the_ District Attorney) and came bacl<
to the boot~ and a aid " the District Attorney

said that if

h~

didn•t convict you for the Grand

Larceny he would place

on~

of several other

I
I

charges against you -'so you better go to trial
right away' • Appellant knowing such a threat to

be without any pessible merit, told Mr. Cassity

he would go to trial as ston as his witnesses
were subpoenaed but Mr. C&ss1ty gave no regard

to the Appellant•& request for his witnesses.
Letters t.o Hon. Clarence E. Baker related all
Sponsored
by the S.J.
Quinney Law Library. Funding
for digitization providedbetween
by the Institute of Museum
Services
of
the
foregoing
diseou:raea
theand Library
Appellan4
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and CourE-anpointed Counsel.
Mr. Lee W. Hobbs,:
0

Appellant submits that !Ir.

Hobbs was very interested in his case and at
first spent quite a bit of his time trying to
help the Appellant.

Appellant further submits

that after having been deserted by his

Mr. Browning and having been treated as
by

Messrs. Houston and Cassity, he was

attorne~
state~

"overl~r

suspicious" and found it rather difficult to
grasp any·acts of honesty from what to the
Appellant appeared to be a "Vicious Circle"
which enclosed and protected the comparativel:;r
wealthy few.

Mr. Hobbs perfected what he told the
Appellant was a

0

Very strong Prima Facie case

of Double Jeopardy on a Writ of Habeas Corpus 'T 1

(In behalf of the Appellant) which Writ was
apparently as strong or stronger that Mr. Hobl,.~,
had concluded because the Court (Judge Van Gott
had to switch from the "very strong case" to
the man and made the following "Against the
man" ruling •••• " Mr. Hobbs, this rnan (referrinc;
to the Appellant)

1 is

using sleight of hand

tactics
-trying to outwit the Court - Writ
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The f~~ing "Against the Han"

ruling made Mr. Hobbs angry and he said he
should take the Writ to the Federal Court but
later said " the inform.ation is wrong; I will
get you out on 'Petit Larceny' which is the
most that the state can make out of the caseu ••
••• this was on the fourteenth of December, but
after Christmas, Mr. Hobbs came over to the
Jail and appeared to be a completely different
man in regard to Appellant's case - despite his
former promise to pursue the question of Double
Jeopardy further and get the Appellant's witnesr
es before going to trial- Mr. Hobbs wanted to
go to trial without those "constitutional
Guarantees. Appellant could not accept such
domination by "might alone" in the complete
absence of any legal basis.
On Jan. 13,

1955,

Honorable, Lewis J 0 nes

sitting for Judge Ellette in a proceeding to
determine whether the Appellant was ready to go
to trial.

After the Appellant explained the

tactics having been employed in his case , to
date, and the state's contention that the DefenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-lbetc. -the :Ud'ge ea.id:

n

lfr. Anderson, we can't

make this man go to trial without his":HA'l,LRI..:\L

WITNESSES", and ordered that the witnessses
whose names ::tnd addresses Appell·ant gave the
Court , "b a subpoenaed" rra_Yld o rde red that Mr • Hob b r
"perfect" Appellant's appeal (from Judge Van
Cott's "Against the Man" ruling) to the Supreme
Court of Utah.

At this point Mr. Hobbs asked

to withdraw from the case and his request was
denied. Mr. Hobbs, like other lawyers appointe·_:
0

.

in this case, was determined to disregard the
Court 1 s orders and even went up to the Sup rene
Court in an attempt to be relieved and was

c;ivc~

the assistance of another attorney but still
did not pe~fect the Appell~Ylt's Habeas Corpus
to the Supreme Court.

This is the same ~~.

Hobbs who stood silent~y bye while the Appell-~ 1 l·
was sent to the State Hospital AGAINST HIS urr,} •
• • • the same Mr. Hobbs who wrote the "Cardstacking" perjured letter noted on page 11 of
Respondent's Brief.

Mro Ashworth: who will be discussed on
other pages.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"t;..J"ith ,~ prosecut1ng agency, the Appellant
requested his services because he has the re:c.-Jutation of going all the way with a client or
not starting on the case - Mr. G·iles chose ths
;fJ!l,&i IG~

latter. It is noted however that/ requested

a:ncl

received a continuance of the Appellant's date

of sentencing to December

24, 1955

but the

Court -probably fearful of his sternness etc.
had the Appellant brought before the Court OlTE
DAY EARLilm THAN THE DATE GRANTED

MR. GILES

IN THE CONTINUANCE - (December 23rdo} and
sentenced the Appellant above his requests for

Mr. Giles to represent him at that " Stage of
the procee-dings against him". (See Record -

Pages 109 & 113}.
Respondent ad:mi t s sue h act ion by the
Cpurt in the second paragraph of page eight (D)

of his Brief. This incident was also mentioned

in Appellant's Brier.
•Right to Counsel means right to Counsel
at every stage or the proceedings"

77-15-1 u.c.A.

lt~J.
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ie ~~a on page 12 of Respondent 1 s
J .

Brief in addition. to page 3 that he

~dmits that.

it. was on the Court Is own motion that the Appell·

ant was examined by two
Roberts~and

s.

in the case of

PsY-chi~trists,

George

Wayne.Smith, it is recalled that
~.

s:

Wayne Smith who committed

the Appellant to the State Ho!3pital has since
been acclaimed one of the Country's leading
Psychiatrists and_now heads the State Mental
Hospital in Idaho.

Yet

iv view

of

thi~,

the

Responde;nt claims that the Appellant "duped"
him into committing him to the said hospital.
The. 1Jl1nutes of the sanity

heari~g

will show that!

the Appellant DID HOT WANT TO GO TO THE STATE
HOSPITAL and aslt.. d the Court if somehow he could

prevent such action to

~ ich

the Court (Judge

Ellett) said ftno".
Also a~ pages 12 and 3 of the Respondent's
Brief, he states that the Appellant was found to

be INSANE,by Dr. OWen P. HennAger and his staff;
which action the Bespondent also discredits as

having been without ·merit as is seen on page 12
of his Brief in which he states that the AppellSponsored
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-19believing that ne was insane.

vJhich raises

the question of whether or not the staff including the Superintendent,

~.

Henninger is

so incompetent that a layman ( as the Respondent states) can "dupe" them into beleiving the
opposite of what is true.

If the Respondent

really believes that the taxpayers money is
being misappropriated in the manner of paying
an incompetent staff at the State Mental Hospi-

tal, his silence on this matter renders guilt
on his part.

On the other hand, if the respondent who
apparently has had little or no training in the
field of Psychiatry believes that the Appellant,
a layman can "Dupe" such nationally known men
(Doctors of Psychiatry) as Doctors,

s.

Wayne

Smith and Owen P. Henninger into believing he
is or was " Insane".

What is there to assure

the untrained (in the field of psychiatry)
Respondent that the Appellant is NOT "duping"
him into believing that he is SANE ??

At the top of page 13 of his Brief, ResponG
claims that Mr. Ashworth never showed unwillingness nor unpreparedness: suoh a claim is
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·20•,
comple-t:~~y deTeated by the record at page 81

where Mr. Ashworth's Motion For a Continuance
exist in which he states that he DID NOT Iffi~2
SlJIFFICIENT TIME TO PREPARE A DEFENSE IN BE-~AL'~·

OF THE APPELLANT. The Court's abuse of its
discretion in denying such valid request
brought about overt unwillingness to go on as
seen in Mr. Ashworth's Notice of Withdrawal
Record - Page 89.
The Utah Statute provides that " A de.fendant shall have at least two days in which to
prepare for trialJ However, it was never intended by the legislature that TWO DAYS would be
sufficient in all cases and under all circumstances.

The

determining factor is not

11

T\'l0

DAYS" but a reasonable time wherein Counsel can
prepare his case or defense consistent with

every right guaranteed a defendant by the constitution and the procedural

State Ceiminal Code.

stat~tes

of the

It mere than two days are

required, the Court should not, even in the
exercise of its discretionary powers reruse to
extend the trial date, tor to do so would be a
clear
abuse of its discretionary powers.
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Tr:_e two aays provided by statute consti-

tute a limitation upon the discretionary poHe:r)c
of the Court. Such a provision protects a defe:J.dant from being forced to go to trial without
preparation - adequate for his defense. If moPe
time is required

1

it should be the duty of tl-k-

Court to extend the trial date to such time as
may be determined by the ccircumstances peculie.:r)
to the case at bar.

Any thing less than this

is a denial of Counsel. Common law and statute
fully support this theory.
Mr. Ashworth, (Counsel for defendant ) was

denied his motion for a continuance of the trial
date despite the fact that he was appointed
Counsel on November

17, 1955

needed additional time.

and felt that he

This denial which

meant a deprivation of Constitutional gurrantec::
for the Appellant prompted Mr. Ashworth to file
a second motion wherein he stated that he had

withdrawn as Counsel for the defendant - November 2l;tt. - f'orz:b days prior to def'p:r,nt • s tria1 .

The motion was demied that

1955.

denie~November
'

It is clear that Counsel WAS NOT

22 ,

PBEPAHil~C

TO GO TO TRIAL WHILE AWAITING THE COURr' S
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..az.
POSITION

011 HIS TWO NOTIONS.

Hence, Hr.

Ashworth had November 2Jrd. and 24th. to prepare which was insufficient and not "Seven ful1
days" as contended by the Respondent.
From the foregoing fact the following conelusions are evident:

1.

Sounsel went otj. record as saying that
he could not repare for trial as of
November 2 , 19
without a continuance.

2.

His withdrawal as counsel, or attempt
to do so is tantamount to an U1fiviTLLI::~G
NESS TO PROCEED HALF-PREPARED.

3•

Counsel was therefore denied

within

the meaning of the Appellant's Con-

stitutional Guarantees.
Respondent's reference to Appellant's
apparent ability to cross-examine certain witnesses is without merit. For even a competent
attorney is entitled to Counsel and it is no
argument that education nor the lack of it is
what determines the need for counsel.

This

#act is clearly set forth in the famous case of

COOKE v. UNIT.ED STATES

267 U. S. 517, 45 s. ct.

390 1 69 L. :lj 767:

An ATTORNEY was brought int.c
Court charged with contempt of Court (Not
committed however in open Court) and his request
tor time and opportunity to secure Counsel and
Witnesses and prepare his defense was refused.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In reve~ng the ~dfudication against Coqke,
Oh~et Justice Tart, speaking for the Court says

at Page 537 of 267

u.

s~

45 s.

ct. 395:

-·

• Due process of law therefore in the prosecution for co:ntempt except that committed in open

Court, requires that the accused should))e
advise~

of the charges and have a reasonable

opportunity to meet them by way of defense or

explan-.tion. We think this include ·the assistaneo:
ce of Counsel, if requested and the right to
call witnesses to gmve testimony, relevant with€·
to the- issue of complete exculpation or- in ex- ·
tenuation ot tne off'en~~e, and, ,in_ mitigation_ of_
the penalty to be . imposedtt• A like rule ls ts
ne<HUl§-~:tJl:£. ,due notice and reasonable oppori;unitz tO *i)~epa~e. a. def~ns(ii)_ is declared in:

.FttAlmLIN:v.

ST.ATB

of ,_So~

JO s•. ct. 64Q, _.$4 L.

E.d~

ROBRS :v. PE<J~ 199 U.S.
50.L. Ed. 256.

Carolina 2i8
980

425,

u.s. ·161

26,s. Ct. 87,
"

HOOKER v. LOS ANGELES 1 188 U. S. 314., 23, S,
Ct. 395, 47 L. Ed. 487, 6~ L. R. A. 47-1
LOUISVILLB. & :NASHVILLE Ry. v. Schmidt, 177 U.--S.

230, 20 S. Ct. 62·0,

44

L. Ed. 747

6 R. c.

L~
P. 446 states that: " The essential
elements of due process~ of law are NOTICE and
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND TO DEFEND IN AN
ORDERLY PROCEEDING adapted to the nature otl the

case" •

..

wThe term 'Due process of Law' when applied to

judicial proceedings, means a~oourse of legal
proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been established ·by o1s1.r Jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of

private rights"··.
PEmlOYER v • NEFF 1

95

U_. S.

714

(2~- L. Ed.

565).
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.!lhe X'~enca -~o

t•

six: attorneys beir:..:=.;

appointed to aid the Appellant. The essence of
such appointments has already been discussed
in preceding pages. If the number of cldmed
attorneys impresses the Respondent, it should
be pointed out that the WHOLE BAR ASSOCIATICl-;
was appointed in the famous case of PO\·JELL v o

ALABAMA, 287 U. S. 45 S. Ct.

55,

the United

States Supreme Court held that the appearance
of Counsel was simp l.y Pro Forma rat her than
zealous and active and that the defendants

1-Jero

not accorded the right to Counsel in any substantial sense.

Among other things, the

u. s.

Supreme_ Court, said at pages 68-69 of 287 Pages
of 53 s: ct •••• " w hst then does a hearin.s
include? historically and in practice in our
country at least it has always included the
right to the aid of Counsel when desired and
provided by the party assertmng the right. The
right to be heard in many oases would be of
11 ttle avail if it did not comprehend the ri;;;i1t
to be heard by Counsel. EVEN THE INTELLIGEnTAND EDUCATED LAYMAN HAS SMALL AND SOMETrnES J.JO
SKILL IN THE SCIENCE OF LAW. If charged with a
crime, he is incapable of generally determininE
for himself whether the indictment is good or
bad, He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence
Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put
on trial without a proper charge and convicted
upon INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE, or even evidence
irrevelant to the issue or otherwise INAU"1ISS.i'IL:-__
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequeo.te1
to prepare his defense even though he may have

64

aSponsored
uerrect
one. ••
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-25"H.t1 ~IMS'JHiu~I:TG HAHD OF COUNSEL ~iT

EVERY STEP IN THE PHOCEEDINGS AGAINST HIH.
without it though he be innocent he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not knoiiJ
how to establish his innocence."
At page 15 the Respondent attempts to
show a discrepancy in the statements of the
Appellant to the Court when a check of the
record would ha!e prevented sucij and error on
the part of the respondent ••• the minutes of
January 13th. taken by Miss. Miriam E. Parker
Hon. Lewis Jones presiding, will show that his
honor said "(To the Dist o Att., ) " 1-JE CAN'T TaY
THIS NAN WITHOUT HIS l}iATERIAL WITNESSES". And

"Mr. Hobbs it is the Courtts orders that you
'Perfect the defendant's Writ of Habeas Corpus
to the Supreme Court". It was on the

foregoi~g

orders that the Appellant's statement quoted
by the respondent (P. 15.) (R. 360) was made.
The respondent vainly tries to suggests otherwise.
Reapondent apparently labors under the
belief that Counsel for the defendant is a
matter of "Either or else" • • o Either stand by 2
silently and let Court-appointed lawyers compromise with the state, take " short cuts" to
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ttagainst "tne1-r

-~ri1.1.~

'=lnd infer

t~J.at

the wrath

of the prosecuting body forces them to stay on
"unwillingly", DR stand alone.

Such a belief',

if entertained, appears to be definitely contrary to the expressed provisions of the Constitution of Utah- Article Io Sec. 12 (In part)
" In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right-to appeaz and defend in person~
AND

BY COUNSEL"••••

ever

~o

There is nothing whatso-

indicate that the defendant mustR

re-

main silent while his "guaranteed rights are
being denied him" ••• there is nothing at all to
indicate that the defendant cannot say somethine
about the possibility of a prison that :E:IE

.ALOH~

will have to serve - not the attorney. There is
not even the slightest suggestion that there
cannot be a mutual understanding on the Cpurse
to be pursued on a question of whether the
accused is to be or not to be freed. Even the
men on Utah'S Prison Death Row are said to ho.:v 0
a choice of how their life should be taken surely the defendant should have some voice
relative to his liberty or the infringement of

it.
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-27cites a case of PEOPLE V. ADANSOH wh!Bh has
no application to the instant case at all for
there is no showing in the record nor

elsew~ere

that the Appellant sought to delay his trial
indefibitelyo
As to the Respondent's decision to cite
MITCHELL v. THOMPSON, surely the "NOTICE OF
WITHDRAWAL -R.89

submitted by Mr. Ashworth and

the substance of his motion for a Continuance
R. 81 that GOOD CAUSE HAD BEEN SHOVJN WHY Tl-IG

COURT SHOULD HAVE APPOINTED ADDITIONAL COUNSEL
AS

THE CITED CASE INDICATES IN

STATED REQUISITES tffiVING BEEN

VIE~J OF

TEE

f~T.

This. contention is supported in the follu1:
ing cases:
PATON v. UHITED STATES: 281 U. S. 276, a12, )0
Ct. 2. 53 263, 74 L. Edo 854, 70 A. L.R. 263.,

s.

" The Court should protect the right of the
accused to have the assistance of Counsel. This
protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty
responsibility upon the trial judge in determining whebher there is a proper waiver by the
accused. While the accused may waive the right
to Counsel, whether there is a proper waiver
should clearly be determined by the trial Cou1.,t
and it would be fitting and appropriate for thai~
determination to appear upon the record•
also see: JOHNSON v. ZERBST, 304 U. S. 458, L!.65
58 s.by the Cto
1019,
1023,
82 provided
L. byEd.
V~6lo
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This 11enol•alne 0mul.,t has ruled that it would
be A PREDJUDIOIAL ERROR TO FORCE AN ATTOR1,lliY

UPON A DEFENDANT IF HE DIDN'T tiANT HIM.

In the Appellant's ease, the Appellant was compelled to not want hia attorney, Mr. Ashworth
upon :receipt of his .ltto:rne7'e NOTICE OF WITHIIU.WAL (B• 89) Which notice :to.llowed his visit

to the

count.,

Jail at Which time he told the

defendant t11at h• d1cl not want to ·handle his
"BUTCBI!RBD

a.ua•

eapeo 1all,- aft e:r the Court had

made it olear to hia that he oould not give the

Appellau.'b a "PA.Dt SIAL• 1n view

or

the Court' s

denial of h1a "Motion for a o'cnt1nuance" (R. 76)
Which MotiOD la quoted (verbatim) on page

6, of

this b:rie.t. Hot only w:aa the Appellant forced

to NOT WAH' hia attom.,- but the Attorney, Hr.
Ashworth.. waa I'OROBD ft.. S'IAY ON THE' CASE' OF

APPELLA.lft' AG.t.Df8! KII OWN WILL AND ABAINST rrrr.IL

WILL OP THE DP.1LLA1! •
On th11 point,. thia Court has reversed thrs

conviction ot Bona14 Pen4el'V1lle. (STATE v.
PENDEB.VIILE 2.72 Pao. 24• 820) •

ville

0&88 L&WJ"8%'8

In the Pender-

WeN toPOed to stay

on. the
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- 29services. tt 1'iW:,7" 'Ue noted that in the Penderville case his Lawyers were WILLING and

PTI~

PARED • Which is just the opposite of the
Appellant Myers's case - his lawyer, Mr. Ashworth was neither WILLING nor PREPARED, as
clearly evidenced by his notice of wchthdra1t-ral
and His Motion for a Continuance respectively.
Hence, parellelled to the Penderville case
equal if not stronger merit existent, -

anc:i.

PRED~L-

DICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR HAS BEEN SHOWN.

Respondent

con~inually

~~fl#lleappointments

emphasizes the

of Counsel to represent

the defendant - two attorneys from the prosecuting agency and the others fearful of tribuments
nal. t!frath. Such appoint.&{ and abuse of disc ret ·:1c
appears to be a wide spread problemg as noted
in the following cases.
COMMONWEALTH

v • JESTER, PA.

441,

100 A.

993 holds that under the state Constitution, a

defendant must be gigen a fair opportunity to
present his defense and to that extent support
our conclusion in the instant case, although
under different facts. Our State Constitution
Article 1, Sec. 9 Provides that the accused
cannot be deprived of his liberty or property
unless by the jud~ement of his peers or the lo_·,;
of the land. The Law of the Land" like Due
Process of Law" requires timely notice and
an opportunity to defendo It is vain to giye
the a~cused a day in court wltn no opportUnlty
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--"30to pr~J.:.4. ~ it-, ~guarantee him counsel
without giving the latter any opportunity to
acquaint himself with the facts or law of the
case. Nor to secure reasonable time to prepare
the defense ••• Every man is presumed innocent
and when accused, entitled to a reasonable
opportunity to prepare his defense, a citizen
cannot be deprived of due process of law, thouf)·,
ever so guilty; if he could, it would be excuse
for mob violence ••• (COOKE v. u.s. /cited/).
At page 18 of his Brief, Respondent (in
his first paragraph) attempts to make what is
"common Practice" and what is Legal, synonymous
in their meaning which is contrary to reason
and the truth of law.
"'Common Practice" may date from the burning of "heretics during religious persecutions
in Ancient Rome to the burnings of"crossestt in
America and in neither case were such actions
condoned as being LEGAL however they were

"CO'MMON PRACTICE" during their era.

Appellant

feels that the Respondent has again gome beyond
the mssue for if "common Practice" and the
"many instances" in which an act occurs is a
criteria of acceptance or approval, then consistently, the "many instances" of crimes and
their obvious "common practice" would render
them legal.
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Again beyond any form of supporting

-31evideu·e

'tl!i?ti£~o·-eVel:'~

the Respondent a ttem?t s

to sell another supposition in stating that
the Appellant promised to plead guilty to a
lesser offense. If such a promise was made, it
would logically have

bean~ to

a person

called by some name, yet the Respondent cannot
NAME ONE - NOT ONE PERSON TO WHOM TEE APPELLAl!.;.'
MADE SUCH A PROMISE OR EVEN SUGGESTED IT OR

IMPLIED IT• Not one such person can the Respondent name no:r produce.
Hespondent quotes 77-24-8 U.C.A. 1953
in an effort to suhatantiate his claim; howeve1•,
he by-passes the faot that there is a
elemen\ involved in
of this rule.

~egard

:t~i=m~e_____

to the application

Surel7 it would not apply when

THE DEFENDANT HAS BlD!N PLACED IN

JEOPARDY

and

the STATE is on • SHAKBY GllOUND" as is clearl;;r
shown 1nl

77·24-ll u.o.A. 1953.

-when the defendant is convicted or
acquitted or HAS BEEN ONCE PLACED IN JEOPARDY
upon an information or indictment, the Conviction, acquittal or JEOPARDY shall be a bar to
another information or 1.nd1ctment for the of.fensc
charged in the former, or for an attempt to
commit the same or tor an otfgnae necessarily
included therein ot which he might have been
convicted under that infgrmation. or indictment".
(Underlining that of Appellant)
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me.nt

~on

to be an infringe;-

the "Guaranteed rights"of the accused

it is fatal to acceptance as is seen in.
SNYDER v. MASSACHUSETTS, 291 U. S. 97 10,5, 54
Cto 330, 332, 78 L. Ed. 6741 90
575,

A.i.R.

s.

" The State is free to regulate the procedure
of' its Courts in accordance with its Olvn con,
ception of policy, unless in so doing it offends:

come principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions- and conscience of o_ur people as to
l_

be ranked Fundamental"~

Still again at page 19 of his Brief, the
Respondent asks the Court to attach some merit
to still another supposition not borne out by
the Record in this matter, and the Respondent
r

admits this - w Though Appellant's Consent does
not appear in the record, it is most logically
presumed that he did either personally or by
and through his attorney agree to plead guilty
to Grand Larceny if the Robbery Charge was
dismissed"•••
Appellant submits that it is clearly
seen amid the evident uncertainty of the Relpondent

as to just how he shou+d s·tate his

.claim that it may sound "logical" in_his emSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- .33 "orb¥ and through his attorney"o•o
Whereas a look at the Record Pages 7-9 Hill
show why the Respondent could not land his
supposition and had to leave it dangling in
air of uncertainty.

c.:;:·,_

At those pages is the

TRUE STORY that has not unto this day been

dis.~

puted that the Appellant was FORCED TO PLEAD
GUILTY

TO GRAND LARCENY UNDER

COERCION OF HIS ATTORNEY.

Ttl~

THREATS "' .. ~.~-·

It is defined in L-=·.:.·.;

that "CONSENT" under any "agreements, Promises
prompted by threats, Coercion, duress etc. are
VOID, and declared .for naught in a Court of
Justice whwrein Hono David To Le-v.ris evidently
presided in view of his granting the

Appellan~~

a change of a Plea that was FORCED upon him.
Another point as to consent rests in the fact
that the party against whom the affidavit

tvas

based could not (truthrully) and did not did pute the Appellant's truth of his using

thre.:=-~L.=

and coercion to e.ffeut the said guilty Plea.
The United State Supreme Court took tho
following position relative to Mississippi
officials
using
Coercion
brutality
toLibrary
POL.>:-_.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitizationand
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thr"ee negroes to CONSENT to signing confessio:1s,

w Because s State may dispense with a
jury trial, it does not follow that it may
substitute trial by ordeal. The rack and the
torture chamber may not be substituted for the
witness stand. The State ma~ not permit the
accused to be hurried to Conviction under mob
domination where the whole proceeding is but a
mask without supplying corrective process.

BROWN et al v. STATE of MISSISSIPPI
278 1 56 S. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682.
MOORE v. DEMPSEY, 261 U. S.

86, 91,

w

297 U.S.

L~3 S.

Ct.

265, 67 L. Ed. 543;
POWELL v. ALABAMA 287, U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55
77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A. L. R. 527••••

"Nor may a state through the action of its
officers, contrived a conviction through the
PRETENSE OF A TRIAL which in truth is but used
as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty
through a deliberate deception of Court and
jury •• o "
M001~v.

340,

HOLOHAN 294 U.S. 103, 112,
Ed. 791. 98 A.L.R 406

342·, 79 L.

55

S. Ct.

At bottom of page 21 of his Brief 1 Respond!
ent implies that what would be "an undesirable

I

situationP to the state should work to deprive

·'

the accused of the Appellant of an over-due
receipt of Justice.

••• Respondent States:

" It would seem to be a very undesirable situation where, because of a minor procedural mistake on the the part or the Prosecuting attorn-1
ey such as occurred in this case, the defendant
in a criminal action should be turned"loose".
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is apparent that the Respondent is

-

a.wer.re that the APPELLANT SHOULD GO FHEE but
he requests the contrary.

Surely the Respond-

ent is aware that the following fatal items
are contained in what he terms " A minor procedural mistake". :

1. The Jury had been impaneled and sworn
to try the accused (& Oliver Townsend)
2o Consistent with the fact of No. 1. the

Appellant was in jeopardy.
HENCE

3• Having been placed in jeopar9-y, the
State could not LEGALLY bring an

"included offense" ~ (Grand Larceny)
against the Appellant lest such action
clearly violate 77-24-13 u.c.A. 1953
which expressly declares that jeopardy
would be a BAR to an included offense
thus giving the Court no jurisdiction
over a BARRED OFFENSE.

4-•

Under Article I, SEC. 12 Const o of Utnl
-· Appellamt could not twice be put in '
jeopardy for the same offense

At page 20 of his Brief, Respondent readily
admits: " There is no question about the law
in Utah concerning former jeopardy. When the
jury has been once impanelled and s"t-vorn the
accused is placed in 1 double jeopardy 1 when or
if he is again called-into Court to aRswer an
information charging him with a crime based
upon the same facts. "' .

~rv·Gon..:

However, faulty the Respondent r s
sent on the part of the Appellant may be,
Appellant asks - HOW COULD CONSENT BE LEGALLY
HAD IN A PROCEEDING THAT ·IN ITSELF IS UNLAWFUL
Sponsored
by the S.J.
Quinney Law Library. Funding
for digitization provided
by the Institute
of Museum and Library
Services
As
the
Respondent
Admits
the
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had
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-36ALREALlY ~ .ESr J:GaeP-:fRDY FOR THE ACTS ( iden t t

cal)acts) constituting the Grand Larceny as
attested by the Bill of Particulars furnished
by the District Attorney -Record -P.

35·

Thus he could not_ enter cpnsent in a subsequent
proceeding because

~ny

such proceeding fDDbidd-

en by State1 s own Statute •••• 77-21.!.-13 UCA.195.:3
w~ich

is quoted (verbatim) on page 31 of this

Brief and which definitely

BARS

the information

of Grand Larceny from ever being legally
brought against the Appellant after having been '
placed in jeopardy on the Robbery cliarge which
the District Attorney states are "One and the
same offense" • (See Record P. 35).
The foregoing is subs-tantiated People v
Chalmers •••••

" A discharge of the jury trying a party
charged with a felony, unless for an overwhelrring necessity, such as death, insanity and the
like, or at the request of such party effects
his acquittal, because-the accused party is
placed in jeopardy when the jury is swornn.
PEOPLE v. CHALMERS

5

U. 201,

14

Po 13lo

Nevertheless, the Respondent asks the
Court regard such a State and Constitutional
violation as a "Minor Procedural Erro:e" to
allow
the
injustclce
to
ageprovided
further
although
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding for
digitization
by the Institute of Museum
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-37in excess of tewnty-seven (27) months.
Relative to the Respondent's admission
of a "IVlinor Procedural Error" and asking that
such be over-looked, such a request disregar:l?
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth

Adr~c;n. -~

ment as set forth by Mr. Justice Brandeis.

WHIT1mY v. CALIFORNIA.
47, S. Ct • 641,

6L~7,

274, U. S. 357, 373,

71 L. Ed. 1095

" Despite arguments to the contrary which had
seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that ti10
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Adrnendment applies to matters of substantive law ;l;;.;
WELL AS MATTERS OF PROCEDURE."
Respondent at page 22 ·(2nd. paragrapgll
of his Brief states that the Appellant was
given"an unfair advantage over the state" It
is beyond any reasonable hypothesis that the
Respondent can really believe a poverty-stricker.
negro of limited education could get an "unfai 1-.
advantage over the competency and genius that
populated the Courto Such an insult to intelligence reaches its zenith when the Respondent
states - in the same paragraph, that ••• " At
this point Appellant was in the VERY ElNIABLL

POSITION OF GOING TO TRIAL
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tc >-

not on the Robbery

~~.,ial

as Ol')iginally set up

but Under the lesser charge of Grand Larceny
a charge he had already pled guilty

to".~

••

(UNDER FORCE).
It is somewhat unbelievable that the
Respondent after admitting that the Appellant
had "THICE BEEN IH

JEOPARDY1 n

(

P. 20 of his

Brief) and knowing such to be definitely contrary_to the Rights of the

Appellant~

would

say that the appellant subsequently should have
gone to trial at all.

Above all, he states

that the Appellant was in the"very enviable
position of going to trial ••••

~

Not going home to his pregnant wife (at that
time) and two infant daughters vh o, needed his
support •••
Not going HO:HE because he had twice been put
in jeopardy for the same offense and refused
to help the State get off " SI-IA1CE!Y GROUNDS 11
BUT t- ere is something to benenvied 11 in a mockery of justice wherein an American Citizen and
Honorably discharged Veteran is kept from his
family after being twice put in jeopardy, forced
to enter a guilty plea, sent to the State

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-39:ijospi'tal \-¥hen he sought "Constitutional
Guarantees", and finally forced - without
Counsel (Prepared & Willing Counsel), without
any "Material Witnesses" in his behalf, and
without being confronted with one of two cornhim
plaintants against/and as the duration of sucl.:.
unjust treatments exceed twenty-seven months
of continuous imprisonment, Respondent pleads
" don't release him - we only made a 'MINOR
a_

PROCEDURAL ERROR'" which of course is/name

for gross injustice.
It is noted that the Respondent dealt at
length with the question of of the Appellant
not being

allowedm~

to

enterB

an amended plea

of not guilty by reasmn of inaanity - Respondo
Brief PP. 22-24.

Which question Appellant feelr

he has sufficiently covered in his Appellant's
Brief.
It is also noted that the Respondent failed to mention an

"AMENDED PLEA" that the

Appellant WAS ALLOWED TO ENTERo That Plea being
"Former Jeopardy". The disregard or the Respondent relative to this Plea; is understandable in
view
~r the Trial Court having made (committed)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RThVE!tSll3l:IE .t.J{RORn' in disregarding such a

Plea in view of this Court's rulings accordingly.
AT RECORD - Page 173
APPELLANT: Your Honor does the Record sho"t-J,
I'm sorry, that I entered an A.l:'lEl\fDED PLEA OF
NOT GUILTY BECAUSE OF PRIOR JEOPARDY. Does the
record show that.

THB

COURT: Well, Mr. Myers, I am not prepared
to say. The file here is very thick and it consists of a lot of your papers and letters and
pleadings and ym are at liberty to look at tho
file and determine for yourself what it shov.rs.

APPELLANT:

Well, I wpuld like to know if the
Court was going to be recognized well then I
would be allowed to say something about it,
something on the prior Jeopardy. That Plea ~{as
entered before Judge Lewis (Judge Ellett)
Because of Prior Jeopardy.
THE COURT: That matter is not in issue at this
time in this case, so far as I know.
HPPELLANT:

Yes Sir.

THE COURT: The only Plea that is here that is
officially made is that of not guilty and upon
that •ssue we will try the case.
The foregoing extract from the record
the record in this case shows that the issue
is not being hi sed for the first time on

appe~:1l

Nor has the Appellant chose this time to raise
the point as is seen in the APPELLANT'S BRIEP
(heretofore filed /May 7,1956) PP. 26-27).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41

I
I ;{~

j ;::

..,,· -:
1

~-t

j 'C::

•.

.

.

I

~

..

I ::e
I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-....
·-

--

Thai:J ·.the

t'orest~ted.

positions taken in rec;ard

t&c.the Appellant • s "Amended Plea u of "Former

Je·opardy" constituted a "REVERSIBLE ERR011" is
corroborated as follows:
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED ·1@53 -

77-27-1.

"Under this section the defense. of Once in
Jeopardy raises an issue of fact to be determined by a Jury and the Court Co1nmits no error in
refusing to rule as a matter of law upon the
evidence that the defendant had beep placed in
jeopardy by a former trial. The Court should
require this of the jury and should not discharge them unt11 they do so. A judgement on
the verdict without such finding will be
reversed.
In re: Barton, 6 u. 264~ 21 P. 998

PEOPLEv. KERM, 8 U.

268~

THOMPSON, 58 U.

296, 199 P. 161, 38 A.L.R.

271, 30

Po

988.

This section was also Applied in STATE v.

697·

291~

Documentary Proof of the Appellant having
entered said Plea of former jeopardy is attached
in the for.ma of ~ified copies of the original transcript of !%' oceedings at the time of
Plea.
·
It is interesting to note that the
District Attorney who represented the state at
the time

t~e

Appellant entered said plea and

Hon. A. H. Ellett who allowed the Appellant to
enter the Plea WERE BOTH PRESENT IN COURT

1VIillN

THE APPELLANT(at Record- P. 173) CALLED THE
COURT'S ATTENTION TO THE FACT 11 I-IAT HE HAD ENTEHED SUCH A PLEA.

Neither his Honor, nor the
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Districl; Attorney informed the Court of their
participation in the proceeding l.vherein the
Plea raised was entered.
At page

24

or his Brier, Respondent

possibly overly-conscious of ·the fact that the
Appellant· should have been released at the
robbery trial states that the jury round the
Appellant guilty of ROBBERY which or course is
not correct.
Respmndent goes on to state that Luck
testified that a watch which he had purchased
A YEAR PRIOR to the robbery (1953) was "HE
GUESS" worth about .fifty dollars at the time
of the taking despite the fact that he only
paid seventy-three dollars for it.
A sharp contrast is noted between the
"GUESS" of LUCK relative to his property and
the expert opinion of the District Attorney e.t
pages 152 and 38 respective·ly. The District
Attorney

stated at page 38 that Luck's watch

was only worth $10.00 - surely the authoritativ'
appraisal of the District Attorney is not to be
discarded in ravor of a "GUESS" of a compb.inant
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding for
digitization providedthe
by the Institute
of Museum and Library
Services
whose
"Guess"
could
contain
sentiment
or
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--

of having associated the watch vJi th a re la -sl-v-e
or girlfriend.

What the value of the watch ls

to luok is not in 'dssue for personal attacbrrlen·'::;
and/or fondness ln conjunction with sentiment
and other irrevelant but influential facto1.,s
would have a natural tendency to cause an
exaggerated appraisal on the pat't of the o1rn1ero

•Where it ia not first shown that an
article haa market value, the answer of a Hitness when asked what is the Market value is
inadmissable"
SMri'H v. GRISWOLD, Bun. (N.Y.) 273
In this oonneot1on at Record. P, 152:

MR• All?IRSOI:

Now what is the value of' the
watch that 7ou had' what kind of watch is exhibit one that you •8.'1 that you had at that
thlef

MR, LUCKI

It la a twenty-one jewel Lord Elgin.

MR, ANDE2!SOH1 _And when had you purchased it ?
MR, LUOltt

Oh, about a year prior to that,

MR. ANDRSOJ!a

What had you pai<:i for itt

MR. LtTCX: Sevent7-three lfgliara.
MR • A.lnlERSOH: And do 70u have an estimate of
the value at the ttme it was taken from you?
MR. WOI:a

Well,. I GUISS about $$0.00

Appellant submits that probably if Luck!

0

mother had given him the watch his answer would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
by the Institute oftake
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thott~ "-t~d

della!"! fo1') ito

Various

Courts have this to say about

"GUESS'' work and personal appraisals:

" What a party paid for property furnis:-:.-:.::.:
by itself no test of valuen.
MILLER v. BRYDEN, 34 Moo App. 602

1
:

In PEYSER v. LUND, 89 N. Y. App. Div. 195,85
Suppl. 881.
" Holding that proof that Plaintiff paid a
certain sum to the owner for loss of goods
while in his possession was not proof of thelr
value" o

N.Y.

It is apparent that in the foregoing line
of questioning by 'he district Attorney that he
was asking for LUCK 1 S opinion and even after
he answered Mr. Anderson

••• MR. ANDERSON:

repeated (R. 152)

Is that your best OPINION ?

I.ffi. LUCK: YES o

Hence, Luck answered as to his opinion.
Such establishment of value has been not been
accepted in other Courts ••••
"Evidence of value by mere opinion of a
witness is not suffucient unless he is sho1r1n tr:-1
possess knowledge of the subject".
IDMONDS v. STATE

42

Nebro 684, 60 N. W. 957

nOpinion of value can be given ONLY by an
EXPERT"
ENGSTER

v.

STATE

11 Nebr. 539, 10 N. W. L1.53
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"The 01.~~-not LeiHg an. expert cannot testify
to the value or the goods to him".

BROOKS v. STATE

28 Nebr. 389,

i~

N. W.

Rewpondent admits at page 24 or his Brief
that the value is determined by what the Propel~·
ty' s Market Value would have been at the time
of the Larceny.

Yet a·discredit to this rule is seen in
the Record at Page 107 which contains a SUBPOENA issued for the State's witnesses •• at
Mid-page are the words ••• "DEAN

JONES AND

W.IYIB WClt ARE DIRECTED TO BRING THEIR

WALLET

AND WATCH .l:NVOLVIJ) IN ~THIS ACTION'' •
Obv:t.oual7 the propertr mentioned, if the

same, had been released from evidence near
sixteen (16) months (July 1, 1954 - November

25, 1955) •• ~ a:l.ateen months out of the evidence
room ••• sixteen months away from the Officers
who claimed to have "Initial the property and
placed it in evidence"••• and still such proper~
ty, or some other propertr is requested by the

state to usa in a proceeding that bore the narcc

of a

trial.
If propert7 having been out of custody,

out of the evidence room approximately sixteen
(16) months was returned and not replaced

r1r.
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Luck ~scaLed

rt;

rap,e lS>lt of the record t~;.a t tLc

band had been originally broken ••• at the
trial the watch

had A

NE1~v

BAND, if the sarr1e

watch as substantiated by Arlene Thompson -

n.

28.5:

APPELLANT: Miss THompson when you saw those
watches down in the lower Court sometime L.1
May (1954) when my preliminary hear was the~ec
watches look like that then ?
MISS. TH0!1PSON: No, I dontt believe so, thj_::'
one was broken down there and this, there arc
different bands on them if I remember correct:ly.

That NEW WATCBX

BANDS WERE VIEWED BY

THE JURY; that improved property PART OF

\'JL.I;:;~.
TI~~···

WAS NOT CONTENTED AS HAVING BEEN STOLEN BY

APPELLANT WAS v iew&'by and ruled on. by the jur·y

" Was of little consequence" oi~ates the
Respondent.

Surely not,agrees the Appellant - the
illegal admission of IMMATERIAL EVIDENCE on
which the jury's verdict had to be based consistent with the offense as charged

- surely

it was " OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE" to the Re snoElib(n.,t~'

dent and the prosecuting agency - their/was not
and is not in jeopardy.

A completely NEW BAND is put on the watc.~·L
and the ResplDndent states at the bottom of

pa.~:e:;;

29 (of his Brief) "THERE WAS NO MATERIAL CHAHGE
IN
THE APPEARANCE OF THE WATCH". despite the
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-47-.
BANDS would naturally be a part of the jury 1 s
appraisal and despite the fact that Luck stated
that he had the watcij. f'ix.ed. (?).

• The value to be proved is that at the
time and place of' the Larceny"

PEOPLE v. COLE, 54 Micho 238, 19 N. W. 968.
Respondent attempts to have the HEARSAY
testimony as to DEAN JONES pass as admissable
despite the fact that at page 152 of the record
LUCK admits freely that all he knew about what
happened to JONES - IS WHAT JONES TOLD Hll1. o o
MR. ANDERSOHt Now while you were inside and
this robbery was going on did you observe what
happened to Mr. Jones what he, was doing?
·

othe~

MR. LUCK: he was over against the/wa11. I
could on~y see him out of the corner o# my e.ye
and the other fellow was over him. Actually I
ooul4n 1 t see very well"
"

~.

MR. ANDERSONt You don't know what happened to

him specifica1l7f

MR. LUCK:

-

NOT EXCEPT WHAT HE TOLD ME.

Surel~

there is no question about what

Jones told Iuol being PURELY HEARSAY and should

not have resulted in its admission nor the
receipt ot any property supposedly belongmng to
a DE.AN JO:NES which admission stemmed from such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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" A witness L.annot express opinion bottomed .&
on HEARSAY information"

·STATE v.

65

r~DLEY

U. 109, 234 Po 940

" Where the only evidence should have been
excluded as hearsay, a conviction cannot be
supported"

STATE v. HAw.KINS

95

Ga. 20 1 S. E. 217•

Appellant submits that Dean Jones or
some one answering to that name was the only
person according to the allegations, that coul\::_
say that the property alleged to have been
stolen, was taken without his consent and/or
that the property taken was actually his
propertx. thus nia presence was definitely
needed it evidence supposedly stolen from him
was to be entered and ruled upon by a

jury~

for the Jury had no way of knowing that a Dean
Jones actually owned a watch and wallet; that
he did not consent to his property, if his,
being taken; nor that a Dean Jones whose
property had been taken illegally) actually
exists - DEAN JONES,

1! there is such a party

having been injured, should have been present
in court as held by this Court •••
" The accused is entitled to be in a position
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-49(Ibid)

'' Wnere~-ulequestion of the Consti-

tutional right of the accused to be confronted
with the witness against him was involved, 11r.
Justice Miner, the writer of the opinion in
speaking of the rights guaranteed the accused
by our constitution (Art. I. Sec. 12) said:
" By our Constitution it is clearly made manifest that no man shall be tried and condemhed
in secret and unheard"•
STATEv • MANNION, 19 Utah, 505, 57 Pac • 5L!.2, 1}.5
L. R. A. 638, 75 Am. St. Rep. 753 ••

:rt~

Respondent (P, 25) states that Luck testified at pages 181-83 of the Record as to exhibit having the "general appearance of Jones'
property whereas the contrayy is noted on page

183:

--

BY MR. MYERS: Mr. LUck would you definitely
say that this is Mr. Jones's watch?

MR. LUCK: No I couldn't say that.
MR. MYERS: You couldn't say that? it could be

anybody's watch as fap as you
MR. LUCK:

c~n

say.

AS FAR AS I KNOW YES.

Thus one of the most important features
was not established that is ownership of the
watch claimed to be the property of an unknovtn
man to the Court and jury - named DEAH JONES.

uOWnership must be proved by sufficient
evidence or the conviction cannot be supportecln
THOI1PSON v • STATE, 23 Tex. App o 356 1 5. S. ~·l,
" Identity cannot be proved my mere
similarity".
BUCHANAN Vo STATE, 109 Ala. 71
19 So. 410. Also STATE v. DUE, 27 N. H. 256
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supposedly named Dean Jones should not

1_l3.Ve

been introduced upon the testimony of Luck

r~.~:

it has been already shown that all that Luc]j
knew about Hhat supposedly happened to Jones
is 14hat Jones told him -

hence, :HEARSAY anc;_

following Courts hold ••••
" Hearsay evidence cannot be introduced for
identific{ition"o

WHIZENANAT v. STATE, 71 Ala. 383
GIBSON v. STATE 114 Gao 3Lh 39, S. E. 9L!.8
STATE v. HARGRAVE, 97 N.

c. 457,

1. S. E. 7?L~--~~

The foregoing applies to the wallets

t~qt

in the subpoena (Ro 107) the men (JOHES ~ LUCT:)
are asked to bring them to court- (BRI1JG
tD.. LLETS TO COURT THAT HAiE BEEN IH THEIR P02,.S-

ESSION APPROXIHATELY 16 Mos.)

Naturally, Nr. Mchenry's Initials were
not still on the wallets after sixteen

month~c;

in the possession of Luck & Jones; there~ore,
Mr. McHenry had to take Luck's word for it tl1r·. 'the same ~iallet was\teing introduced in evidorwc;
thus another usuage of HEARSAY evidence

contra 1 '~

to the foregoing authority against sucho
At pages 30-31 of the APPELLANT'S BRI:L·;F
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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refers to the

Attorney's

attempt to excuse the absence of A

'J

JONES before eliciting the hearsay testimony
of Luck as to Jones. In answer to a letter he
attempted to enter the Court told him he may
"file it but it was "hearsay" as to the fact ft.
~

The following Courts have held that the
production of .the witness is not excused by
I

sicJness at the time of the trial.

R. Co. v. MAYER 91 Ill. App. 372
THORNTON v. BRITTON,
22 Atl. 1048

144 PA. St. 126,

94

SCOVILLE v. HANNIBAL etc. R. Co.

876. s.

Mo.

84,

w. 654.

(Paralysis) Reg. v. WILSHAW,

L.

131~

C~

145, 41 E. c.

84.

COMM. v. Mckenna,_
389
STATE v. STAPLES

Dec.

565

158

47

Mass. 207,

33, N. E.

N. H. 113, 119, 90, A. :H.

"Sickness" was the grounds on which Mr'•
Anderson sought to excuse the Appellant's rie;ht ·
to be confronted by a DEAN JONES.
Appellant submits that anly because
property alleged to be owned by and having
been taken from a DEAN JONES without his consent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Funding for digitization
provided by the Instituteagainst
of Museum and Library
Services
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- 52does' he complain about his not being present

at the trial and especially because i' is
clear that the property of someone other than

luck had to be entered to satisfy the State's
version of Grand Larceny. The only expert
testimony in this case as to value was made

by

the District Attorner (Record P. J8) at which
page he states that the total value of propert:;~
taken from Wa'J'ft• L\J.Ok waa

Therefore-the propertJ

or

t

l!eOO dollard. •

uneatablished owner-

ship had to be added to attempt a .figure in
excess of tift7 dollars - aa required under tLc

info:rmat1on" and tfJDU.RSAY BVIDENCE" had to be
entered.

The following Ooarta have taken this
position as to suoh praotieet
" The values of articlea or p:ropertr stolen freT;
different owners or even .from the same owner
·
at different tiaea 0.1\HNOT BE OOMBII.ID TO MAIIT;
OUT AN OFFBlfSB OJ' GIUlfl) LARCENY•.

ALABAMA •

so.

929.

BROW v. S'l'ATE lOS, Ala. 117, 16

'

"-lhe Oonv1cst1on must be for petit La.rcen•r
if the Prosecution does not af'f1:rmat1vely prov~0
the value required tor Orand Larcenr"•

PEOPLE

Ye

COMY.IS 114 Oale 107,

4S

Pace

1034•
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Q.Q!'!£LU S IOU

Page

53-

In the foregoing pages the Appellant has
affirmatively shown beyond any reasonable hypothesis to the contrary that rights guaranteed
him through the virtue of the state and Federal
Constitutions have been somewhat wijolly denied
in such specific acts as follows:
(1.) Appellant has been twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense under informations
Nos. 14608 and 14571 both of which the District
Attorney admits at page 38 of the record "are
one and the same" offense. The Respondent at
page 20 ()rd. Paragraph) of his Brief stated
that the Appellant was twice put in jeopardy
for ihe same offense but asks that such a violation be excused as a "MINOR PROCEDtJRAL ERROH.
( 2.) That in violation of the State's own CODE
77-24-13 u.c.A. 1953, another information(l46o8:
was brought against the Ap~el1ant alleging that
he committed the"identical and "same" acts)
for which he and his codefendant, Oliver Townsend were already in Jeopardy at the very moment that the additional information was brought
before the Court and th~ Appellant was forced
by coercion and threats to enter a plea of
guilty against his will.
( 3o) The Appellant was denied " Due Process
of law" under the Guarantees afforded under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U. s. Constitution
in that he was denied the right to the assistance of competent counsel in his behalf. despitE
the "COMPELLED" services of an UNWILLING and
UNPREPARED Mr. Ashworth (RECORD PP.89 & 82 Respectively). Appellant was denied a compulsory
~rocess to compell the attendance of witnesses
MATERIAL WITNESSES" in his behalf and to be
confronted by an important witness against him.
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CONCLUSION -

:ti.

That is nF~H 30NES who, if existent, is claimed to own the property entered against the
Appellant in persuading the Jury that such
property had been stolen by the accused.

(4.) Contrary to the Provisions of UTAH's

77-27-1 u. S.A. 1953, the Appellant's "Amend-

ed Plea" of FORMER JEOPARDY was not recognized

by the Court nor put before the Juryo The Jury

was dismissed without any knowledge of nor
ruling on the Appellant's herein attested Plea
of former Jeopardy hence consistent with former
l'Ulings by this Honorable Court in State v. _
Kerm & STATE v. BARTON ••• A reversible error
was committed.

(5.) Mr. Wayne Ashworth, Att., was forced to
stay on the Appellant's case against the will
ot the Appellant and against his own will as
seen in his Notice of Withdrawal.(R.89) Such
force as to Counsel for a defendant who did not
want such compelled services, was found to be
PREDJUDICIAL and REVERSIBLE in STATE v • Pender·
ville, (U. 272 Pac. 2d. 820).

(6.) After the State failed to affirmatively
establish value in excess of $501 00 as required
and only succeed in showing that $22.00 was the
only admissable and competent evidence, such
evideace, if really admissable, should have in
itself demanded a verdict not exceeding PETIT

LARCENY0

In view of the foregoing numerically
arranged injustices. the question naturally
arises - IS A CONVICTION REALLY SO PRECIOUS
THAT IT MUST BE SOUGHT BY SUCH ILLEGAL MEANS??

As forestated, Attorney General, Hon.,
Herbert Brownell Jr., contends that the prose-

••t/o/J

Ahas a " duty over and above prosecutions and
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CONCLUSION -· IIl.
convictions, that -1--s- to see that justice is
done"•
Justice in this case would have meant
that when the Appellant's Co-defendant, Oliver
Townsend, held under th~ same " Ear-witness"
"identification" as the Appellant was released

• in the interest of justice" on July 1, 1954
despite the fact that at the time of his release, he was still under the Jurisdiction of
Judge, Mays for having shot off some part of
his wife's nose. T.he Appellant, NEVER HAVING
BEEN UJIDER THE SLIGHTEST SUSPICION FOR ANY

CRIME OF VIOLENCE, - Under the "Equal protection Clause" and " equal justice for al.l theory"
the Appellant should ALSO have been released
" in the interest of justice".

Instead of beinr

forced to plead guilty to an information that
the State's own CODE -(77-24-13 UOA. 1953) says
could not legally be brought against the Appell-

ant i.e., " AN INCLUDED OFFENSE" after having
been put in Jeopardx.

The Respondent has relied heavily upon
showing ( contrary to reason) that the matters
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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-50discr&tioR

~ ~ ~1

Court, which of Course

is a theory completely unsupported by the

Con~

stitution of the State of Utah.
The following has been said

for the bene-

fit of those who would try to persuade with sucl
a contention. • •

" It is authoritatively stated that the
right _of a citiz:en to 11 D.le process of Law" must
rest upon a basis more-substantial than favor
or discretion" •• 6. R. c. L. 443•
The Respondent at page

4 of his Brief calls

attent~on

to a supposition or rumor that the

Appellant

~d•thBBatened_

led Banner•.

to sing the Star Spang-

Any expressed desire on the part

of the Appellant, a World War II •• honorably
discharged Veteran should go to the credit of
his patriotism from having spent 19bmonths of
"Honorable SWrvice" in the Pacific Theater of
-

~

War and should not be a fact0r against htm in
a Court of Justice•
Appellant submits that the conduct of the
accused was that of "Myers a former mental patient" and not "Myers the Appellant", and such

eon~ct - howe~er, "reprehensible" should not

-
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• S7•
Appel~ ~ • ~-:landed Justice" afforded

hiall through ~he Fourteenth Amendment •• (STATE

v. ST • CLAIR).

In re: McKEE, 19

u.

231 1

re: MAXWELL 19 u~ 156, 61 P.

57 P. 23 and in
557•

The following position is taken relative to the
conduct of the accused:.

• Every citizen regardless of his action
OR oonaitien, is entitled to the equal protection ot the law whethe~ it ~-appl.ies to his person-

I,

al or propert'J r6gla:ta • &rery law whioh offends

against that principle

in

the Fedaral Constitut-

ion is neeeasarJ17 invalid•.

-

.

A close parellel is noted between the case

ot _the Appellant and " THE SMITH CASE" (Sat • Evn
Post,-8-15-$3 PP!- 30 & 102-106) James Colbert
Smith is a negro: he bas a history of mental ill·
ness J he has an extens1 ve prior criminal record.

•••• ~he Smith 8&Se was Justice's lonel7 orphan.
The web that was woven 1~ it gave Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter " an unrelievable feel.

~

1ng ot disquietude• ••• the Smith case was kept

alive

tor tive 7ears only because A HAND-FULL of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-58--

men ~elieved the princVPles it embodied were
vital· 1ftt l!l! ~•• •
n •• To be specific& do the courts have an obligation to protect.the accused who come before
tham? Do the prosecutors share in this obligation? or is the task ot guarding defendants. the,,
unique and lonely function of defense attorneys
are the
••• These/questions questions that go to the
heart of the Smith Case and indeed they rise to
the level ot the United States Constitution itselt.
•••" Justice teeds on precedence and every
timla.tbug such as Smith is denied his Comstitutional rights. it beeimes much easier to deny
thise rights to the pre~ably innocent.

• As white-haired Federal District Court
Judge. George A. Welsh - one of the key figures
in t~is case -.ob•erved: ••••• n ! 1 11 tell• you
gentlemen •• the Const1tll.t1on of -the United State:
is ABOVE US ALL• and all I am attempting to do
is see it the.law of Pennsylvania compels him (SMITH) TO GO IW!'O THE BING WITH ONE HAND TIED
AND EXPECTS HIM '1'0-FIGHT A BATTLE ••• th!s .ia a

moilt important situation ••• we are dealing with
the Oonst1tut1en • - that is a document that wilJ
be torn to shreds unless the judges do their dut~
ever7 bit of erosion,- every· time you belittle
it, every time you ignore it, even though the
crime may be heinous. is destructive to the
fundamental rights of humanitY'"•

••• Yet• let it be said: the questions of law
that have been raised h~re were not posed in any
att~Jt to whitewash Smith or deny the callousne~
and brutalit7 of the tilling. The one issue is
whether what was done to htm. erodes the Constitutional Guarantees intended to protect us all •• ~
Again the Appellant asks it a conviction so
precious to the state that it must be sought in
the absence of any regard tor • Constitutional
Guarantees
intended
protect.us
all"???
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-59Wit-h what-the Respondent at page

17

of his

Brief calls "the Appellant's misconception of
the law", the Appellant now comes before this
Honorable Court seeking justice on the foregoing denials of

11

Guaranteed rdl,ghts" •

Mr. Justice Coulter had this to say about
the appearance in his Court of those persons
often termed - " underprivileged 11 , "forgotten
-

-

men at the bottom of an economic pyramid" and
" Cursed like chickens that still come home to
roost"•••
Mr. Justice Coulter: 11When the humblset
citizen comes into this Court with the Constitution of his Countri in his hand, we dare not
disregard the appeal • BROWN v. HUMMEL, 6. Pa.

86, 97, 47 Am. Dec. 431•

That a conviction by any means other than
those expressly set forth in the Constitution
of the United States should not be condoned,
has already been shown in the foregoing cases
cited.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter has taken a position synonymous with rulings by this Court •••
In re:

SACHER v. UNITED STATES 343 U. S.
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t.i~)-

1. (195.3) - .)~it-ccr experience has sharpened
our realization that a major test of true demorcracy is the fair adminitration of justice •••
time out of mind this Court has reversed convictions for the most henious offenses even
though no doubt as to the guilt of the defendants was entertained. They webe reversed becaus(~
THE MODE BY WHICH GUILT WAS ESTABLISHED, disregarded those standards which are so precious an.
so important to our society".
The Appellant should no longer be held
in excess of the near twenty-eight (28) months
that he has spent continuously behind prison
walls, during which time clearly violated
rights have gone without any for.m of redress.
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